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I.

INTRODUCTION

MICHAEL GORDON: We are looking at the area of cross-border product
liability litigation involving Mexico and the United States. Our hypothetical'
consists of commercial and tort litigation in the United States, or contractual and
extra-contractual objective liability in Mexico. There is an increasing number of
contract and tort cases evolving from commercial relations, due to the fact that there
is more trade and much more foreign investment in Mexico, and thus there are more
accidents in foreign-owned plants, like the explosion in our hypothetical. Like many
civil law and common law nations, there are significant differences in the tort law
in Mexico and the United States. These differences are also reflected in the
quantum of law, both in terms of case law and writings, dealing with tort law in the
United States and Mexico.
We also have, it seems, in the case of Mexico and the United States, a different
cultural perspective of the responsibility of persons. In Mexico, all states except
Quintana Roo have the basic civil code provision2 that states that a person is
responsible for the damage they cause, and then states the exception that the victim
is liable himself for his own negligence. Quintana Roo has removed the exception
clause3 in order to encourage tourism. In the United States, there is apparently a
different sense of a person's personal responsibility.
In contrast, contract law in the two jurisdictions is more convergent. Both the
United States and Mexico are members of the Convention on Contracts for the

* A summary of the background of each of the participants in this panel follows on the last page of the
panel discussion.
1. Set out in Appendix A to this article and adapted from FOLSOM, GORDON &SPANOGL MERNATIONAL
BUSINES TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK (4th ed. 1999).

2. See Cddigo Civilparael DistritoFederal[C.C.D.F.], art. 1910: "Whoever, in acting illegally oragainst
good customs causes injury to another, is obliged to repair it, unless he proves that the injury occurred as the
consequence of the fault or inexcusable negligence of the victim."
3. See generally C~digo Civil para Quintana Roo [C.C.QUINrANA Roo].
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International Sale of Goods (CISG).4 Consequently, although application of U.S.
versus Mexican law outside of the scope of the CISG differs, when we take the
CISG into consideration, we find that there is a certain harmonization between the
two jurisdictions,5 at least in what the law says, if not necessarily in how courts will
interpret that law.
As for the hypothetical, it is similar to the Benlate case with DuPont.6 Growfast
Chemicals, Inc. (Growfast), is chartered in Delaware with principal administrative
offices in Dallas, and manufactures a pesticide and fungicide, Sollate. In addition
to manufacturing facilities in Texas, it has a wholly-owned subsidiary called
Growmex, S.A. (Growmex), in Veracruz, Mexico. The commercial claims of the
problem deal with contracts for the sale of the Sollate, which has caused damage to
Mexican commercial growers' crops. However, the sales have been invoiced from
the U.S. Growfast Company, if that makes any difference.
The tort side of the problem comes out of an explosion that took place in the
plant in Veracruz. It caused the death of thirty-five Mexican employees and a U.S.
technician who was on loan to the plant from Growfast in Texas. It also caused
some deaths and injuries to a number of people outside the plant-French and
German citizens, a U.S. couple who were tourists in the area, and area residents. To
include a question of defamation, the fact pattern includes an inappropriate
comment made in Mexico City by the president of Growfast shortly after the
accident, in which he blamed the explosion on corrupt Mexican government
officials that had accepted payoffs during the plant construction. The resulting
inadequate safety walls in the dilution room did not contain the explosion in that
room. That statement was spread throughout Mexico and the United States. The
president has apologized but has cancelled his plans for a forthcoming vacation in
Mexico.
In today's exercise, we will look at the various actions that have been filed and
discuss why they have been filed where they were. There are contract actions that
have been initiated in the United States, in Brazoria, Texas, by commercial growers.
There are also a number of contract actions brought in Mexico, in both state court
in Veracruz and federal court in Mexico City, because the suits have named both
Growmex and Growfast. The Growmex plant is in Veracruz and the company has
offices in Mexico City.
Several tort actions have been initiated in the United States. The two U.S.
tourists, the estate of the U.S. technician, as well as some of the injured Mexicans
employees and area residents have brought suit in the United States in a Texas state
court. One Mexican government official who was accused of taking bribes by the
president of Growfast has brought suit for defamation against Growfast and the
company's president in state court in Dallas, Texas. The German tourist who was

4. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale ofGoods, April 10,1980,19 I.LM. 668 (1980). and
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, 19 .L.M. 551 (1980)

[hereinafter CISG].
5. In Mexico, the C6digo de Commercio (Commercial Code) is federal. In the United States, the U.S.
Constitution grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign nations." Const., art. 1,sec. 8. cl. 3.
6. See In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company (Benlate Litigation),99 F.3d 363 (1 Ith Cir. (GA)
1996), cert. denied, du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Bush Ranch, Inc., 522 U.S. 906 (1997).
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injured has done the same. Of course, all of these lawsuits ask for extensive
discovery under U.S. rules, jury trials and punitive damages.
Suits have also been initiated in Mexico including the suits by the remainder of
the injured Mexicans and the two other governmental officials the President of
Growfast accused. There is also a tort action initiated in France brought by the
injured French travelerunder the jurisdictional basis of the domicile of the plaintiff,
that is nationality.
There is also a potential lawsuit against the companies in England and Japan that
provided some of the ingredients. Although they argue that the explosion was the
fault of Mexican employees who disobeyed instructions of the U.S. supervisors,
Growfast is of the belief that the English and Japanese companies are partly
responsible for the explosion. Both have denied any responsibility, but Growfast is
prepared to bring a claim against both of them in Texas if they see things going
badly.
11.

CHOICE OF JURISDICTION

The question with which we begin is whether there should be an attempt to
remove the actions that have been brought in the United States to somewhere else,
not necessarily Mexico, under the theory offorum non conveniens?
ADOLFO JIMENEZ: As counsel for Growfast, I would try to remove the claims
of the commercial growers from Brazoria, Texas, because it has no connection to
the facts of this case, to Washington, D.C., or Dallas. If you are going to sue
Growfast, you may have a higher likelihood of getting a fairer hearing in Dallas,
Texas. The second factor I would look at is what are the damages going to be in the
United States versus Mexico. Damages in Mexico tend to be very small, so there
would appear to be a clear advantage in having the case moved to Mexico.
My concern in this type of case, though, is the nature of the event. You are
talking about a huge catastrophe that is likely to be very politicized no matter where
it occurs in the world and it may not get the kind of treatment that you would
ordinarily expect. You may be exposing yourself to a great deal of liability and
damages in Mexico that maybe you didn't contemplate in the beginning. I would not
just go ahead and assume that removing them and getting the case moved to Mexico
is the best case when you're dealing with this kind of disaster.
JOSt SANTOS: In my view, the first reaction as counsel to Growfast would be
to remove it to a foreign country, particularly where compensatory damages are low.
However, once one starts thinking about it, one would realize it is a politicized
situation. Nonetheless, whether to remove it is a tremendous dilemma because,
given the significant Mexican-American population in Texas, a jury that would
absolve Growmex or Growfast from liability may be difficult to obtain.
Furthermore, given the magnitude of this tragedy, it may inflame any U.S. jury. I
think you have a significant dilemma here in terms of removal for forum non
conveniens.
JIMENEZ: It is also critical to consider what law applies, because if you believe
that you can succeed in arguing to a U.S. court that Mexican law applies, you have
a huge advantage in litigating that case in the United States, in your hometown,
providing a higher degree of certainty. But if you are not very confident that you are
going to get Mexican law to apply to this particular case, the call is harder.
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DAVID EPSTEIN: There is a split in how the courts would decide based on
whether it is a contract remedy or a tort remedy. Under a contract claim, in this
case, the contract specifies that Texas law should apply but removal to Mexico
might lose you jurisdiction over Growfast. On the other hand, regarding the tort
claim, the majority of the facts happened in Mexico. It seems logical that a court
would view Mexico as the center of gravity and move it there. However, from a
fairness point of view, Growfast seems to be an indispensable party to the tort
action, so it could be that a U.S. court might condition the removal to Mexico by
requiring a stipulation of consent to jurisdiction by Growfast to the tort action in
Mexico.
GORDON: Maybe we should move it from Texas to elsewhere in the United
States where there is more capacity to handle a decision of this dimension, as
suggested by Republic ofBolivia v. PhilipMorrisCompanies,Inc.' The focus often
is to get it out of the United States, no matter where it is brought. However, it may
be that there are good reasons to keep it in the United States, but not where it is
initiated. It raises the issue that we may lose control if we remove it, and there may
be consequences to that.
CARLOS LOPERENA: Regarding jurisdiction in Mexico, this case could be
considered commercial because the defendants, Growmex and Growfast, are
merchants. The Commerce Code establishes the jurisdiction in favor of the domicile
of the defendant or the debtor. Domicile of the company is usually where it is
incorporated. Growfast is incorporated in the United States, Growmex in Mexico.
In this case, the debtor and the defendant are the same, so jurisdiction should either
be Mexico City, where it has its offices, or Veracruz, where it has its facility. Most
likely, the company would be incorporated in Mexico City. Mexico does not have
the notion offorum non conveniens regarding jurisdiction. It has just the domicile
of the defendant or the jurisdiction to which the parties have submitted themselves
in a contract.
For torts, if there is a branch of the company in the place of the tort, the
jurisdiction of the branch is one proper venue for bringing a lawsuit. Another proper
venue would be Mexico City as the main domicile, or the social domicile, of the
company.
Regarding the lawsuit brought by the employees against Growmex in Texas, it
is not valid jurisdiction because all the liabilities of the employer are covered by the
Mexican Labor Law and these kinds of labor accidents have to be paid through the
Social Security Institute. If the employer has its employees recorded in the Social
Security Institute, the employer is released from any liability and the one who
assumes the labor liability is the Social Security Institute.
There is a U.S. case in which I was hired as an expert witness in Mexican law
that illustrates this situation. The crime occurred in the north of Mexico, pertaining
to a maquiladoracompany8 based in Ciudad Juarez. It had a parent company in El
Paso, Texas, and a subsidiary maquiladora plant in Palomas, Chihuahua. Two
employees departed Juarez to take the payroll money in cash in a rental car to
Palomas, but they never arrived. The employees were discovered burned to death

7. See 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009 (S.D. Tex., Galveston Div. 1999).
8. A foreign-owned, export-oriented assembly plant.
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in the trunk of the car. The money was gone and the criminals were unknown. The
parents of one employee went to the company asking for the payment of the labor
liability and were sent to the Social Security Institute, who paid them. The company
also had some private insurance that paid the insured amount to the parents. In
addition, they filed a lawsuit against the El Paso parent company. They wanted
American law to be applied to the case, because Mexican law would apply a low
cap on the indemnification. They argued that the decision of taking the money by
car from Juarez to Palomas was made in the United States, by American citizens.

Of course, there was no problem in applying American law against an American
defendant in the United States. You are not trying to apply American law to a

Mexican corporation or a Mexican individual. Under American law, losses,
damages, and punitive damages would be very high.
AUDIENCEMEMBER/BROOKS: Tequila Brooks, Dallas, Texas. I understand
that, under the Mexican workers compensation law,9 if the company is found to be
have engaged in intentional actions which resulted in the injury, the person gets a
little more benefit. How does the Social Security Agency make that decision when
it is determining workers compensation benefits? Also, if Social Security made that
determination, would the plaintiff's attorney be able to use that decision as res
judicata in a U.S. court case? In other words, can the decision of intentionality by
Social Security be used as a fact in the plaintiff's U.S. lawsuit?
LOPERENA: If I didn't misunderstand you, I think that your question is what
is the difference between intentional damages and accidental damages, mainly when
the damage is bodily injury. In Mexico, there is no difference under the social
security law.'" But if you have an intentional injury, there is an additional
proceeding, that of the criminal offense against the individuals who caused the
injuries, rather than against the company." If the individuals are adjudged to be
guilty, the indemnification would be a consequence of the criminal judgment and
owed by the authors and perpetrators of the crime. I don't know if such an
indemnification could be covered by Social Security. The employer-company
complies with its liabilities by registering its employees with Social Security.
EPSTEIN: Regarding the application of American law, if I understood the
question correctly, if the case stayed in the United States on the tort claim under
state law and if, under a choice of law clause, the court determined that Mexican
law should apply, then I think they would apply the workman's compensation
provisions.
GORDON: There would have had to have been a case in Mexico which had
been decided in order to have resjudicata.
A series of cases were brought in Costa Rica resulting in a whole series of
decisions. Now, in the United States, a court has been looking at whether or not, in
applying Costa Rican law, it will look at res judicata. We have looked to see
whether or not Costa Rican law recognizes res judicata on these issues. Having
found that it does, the U.S. court is accepting the res judicata. In our example, I
think there has to be a decision in Mexico.

9. See Ley Federal de Trabajo [LF.T.], aMts. 495 and 502.
10. See Ley del Seguro Social, art. 46.
11. See Cildigo Penal para el Distrito Federal [C.P.D.F.]. art. 10.
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One of the questions that comes up is whether a court is more likely to remove
a matter when no U.S. citizens are plaintiffs.
JIMENEZ: The answer depends on whether the plaintiffs have a reason for
bringing that action there. What is difficult about moving the claim from Texas is
the presence of Growfast in Texas. That will be a factor in the analysis. The court
will go through a balancing test starting with a public interest test and then a private
interest test, looking at all of the facts in this particular case and the connection of
the case to this particular forum. It also will consider how much impact on the
court's resources and docket the case will have in contrast to the connection of the
case to that particular forum. It is difficult for a company that is located where they
are being sued to get a case moved. But in this case, there is a major catastrophe that
occurred somewhere outside of Texas.
GORDON: Does the court treat the question differently if we are asking to
remove it to a foreign country as opposed to asking to remove it to Washington or
another U.S. location?
JIMENEZ: That is going to be a major factor in the analysis. The court will look
to make sure that there is an adequate forum to provide a remedy to the plaintiff. If
the court finds that there is no adequate alternative forum, then it won't be removed.
Another factor which a court will look at is whether the defendant is accepting
jurisdiction where it is asking a case to be moved. To remove the case to Mexico,
the defendant would have to be willing to accept jurisdiction there.
EPSTEIN: One of the things that is very confusing about this area is that ruling
onforum non conveniens is entirely within the court's discretion. So, it depends on
how this test is presented to the court. Whether the foreign country is an adequate
alternative and has an adequate remedy is a subjective analysis. Both sides would
argue about whether Mexico constitutes an adequate forum, raising the question
whether there is an effective tort remedy under Mexican law.
However, I still think that, based on what I have seen in the U.S. cases, the center
of gravity shifts to Mexico here because so much in our hypothetical happened in
Mexico. The court would analyze where the witnesses are, where the accident
occurred, where the proof is, how the witnesses are going to be examined, how easy
is it to get evidence from the Mexican witnesses if the case stays in the United
States versus how difficult it would be to obtain the evidence in Mexico.
JIMENEZ: One factor that I think is relevant here is whether the plaintiffs'
attorneys are going to punish you for objecting to the forum, dragging you through
a very onerous discovery process. Plaintiffs' attorneys know full well that they get
the advantage that it may be a year before a court decides on the forum issue, and,
in the meantime, they will be able to get all of the discovery they are ever going to
need in the case.
GORDON: We have a dilemma. If counsel for Growfast wants to remove it, the
court is likely to require Growfast to submit to personal jurisdiction in Mexico.
However, in the suits brought in Mexico against Growmex and Growfast, what is
the Mexican understanding about piercing the corporate veil,' 2 although you don't

12. Piercing the corporate veil-In the United States, this is ajudicial doctrine that allows a plaintiff to hold
a parent company liable for actions of a separately incorporated subsidiary company controlled by the parent either
because the separate corporate identity had not been respected or because of other exceptional circumstances.
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talk about it in those terms? Do you think a Mexican court, in the Mexican initiated
cases, would assert jurisdiction over Growfast?
LOPERENA: A Mexican court would assume jurisdiction over Growfast if it is
a co-defendant with Growmex. There is a rule that when there is more than one
competent court, the jurisdiction will be assumed by the court chosen by the
plaintiff. 3 It is common for a plaintiff to sue a foreign company along with its
Mexican subsidiary just to obtain jurisdiction, even if the facts that give rise to the
lawsuit occurred before the Mexican subsidiary was incorporated. In that case, the
Mexican subsidiary has nothing to do with the case, but that is the way the Mexican
court assumes jurisdiction.
The veil piercing doctrine is mostly unknown in Mexico; in most cases, the
liability of shareholders is only limited to the payment of the shares. We could say
in cases of a tort that, as per the Federal Civil Code, those who cause the damage
in common, acting jointly, are jointly liable. 4 But it can be difficult to determine
who caused the explosion. In cases where it is the product or the misuse of the
product or the product stored in a defective warehouse, I think the parent company
would not be liable, but the Mexican court would assume jurisdiction against the
parent company.
FRANCISCO VELAZQUEZ: In Mexico, we do not recognize the notion of the
corporate veil, but we do have the notion of the economic unit. It is only applicable
to labor cases in which a corporation is involved. For instance, at the first level is
a corporation that is a holding company. At the second level is a service company
and also at the same level, but as a separate entity, is an operating company. You
do that in order to manage the profit sharing which flows from the operating
company which has no contact with customers. You staff all the three companies.
An employee who has been dismissed can sue both the service company, which is
his only employer, plus the operating company under the concept of the economic
unit. The Mexican law for corporations clearly states that, once you form a
corporation, the corporation is an independent company from the shareholder."5
Also, if the shareholder is another company, it also remains as an independent entity
from the shareholder.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/SOCORRO: Marie Socorro Carellas from Mexicali.
Piercing of the corporate veil does exist in Mexico under the C6digo Fiscal de la
Federaci6n under the tax code. Any contributions due by the company as a
consequence of its operation that are not paid by the company may be collected
from the shareholders. The only limitation is that the shareholders individually are
responsible in proportion to their percentage participation in the capital stock. It is
contemplated as a joint obligation.
GORDON: Let me just raise this. It is something that is happening that worries
me. An Ecuadorian shrimp litigation case is an example. After being successful on
a motion for forum non conveniens in Florida state court, 6 the twenty-eight

liability also may be imposed on directors and officers of a corporation, but only on even more extraordinary
circumstances.
13. See Cddigode Comercio [COD.COM.j, arts. 1106 and 1120.
14. See C.C.D.F., art. 1917.
15. See Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [L.G.S.M.]. art. 87.
16. See Ciba-Geigy Limited v. Fish Peddler, Inc., 691 $o.2d 1111 (Fql.Ct. App. 1997).
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plaintiffs went back to Ecuador and got a law passed. The law states that when
Ecuadorian plaintiffs have a choice of initiating a suit in Ecuador or abroad and they
have chosen to initiate that suit abroad, it may not be initiated in Ecuador after a
successful motion forforum non conveniens. All twenty-eight of them then filed as
plaintiffs in Ecuador and all twenty-eight plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss.
Twenty-seven courts granted it. When the twenty-eighth judge did not, he was
removed from office and replaced by a judge who would grant it. They are now
back in the United States in federal court. 7 It is something that was passed very
clearly to benefit these shrimp farmers in Ecuador to give them an opportunity to
get higher damages by bringing suit in the United States. This is not unique to
Ecuador; it has spread.
EPSTEIN: At least five or six Central American countries have adopted such
laws, but I don't think a U.S. court has ruled on whether the existence of those laws
means that there is no adequate alternative forum and thus would uphold keeping
the case in the United States. My guess is that a U.S. court would not recognize the
validity of those laws and would rule that it violates U.S. public policy to allow
coercion to keep any case in the United States on the basis of such foreign laws.
SANTOS: That would also create a real dilemma for the lawyers who are
defending this because they are going into court not knowing what is going on in
the home country. They get removed to the home country and now they are stuck.
Conceptually, they need to come back into the United States if they were kicked out
in the first instance.
GORDON: I tend to agree that the American court is not going to permit the
foreign court to dictate whether or not the U.S. court believes that there is an
adequate and available forum, because there is an ability to waive the prohibition.
I think the U.S. court would say go back and waive it because we are now closed
to you.
III.

CHOICE OF LAW

GORDON: Let's move on if we can to some other areas. Let's look at the
question of whether we want to have Mexican law applied in the U.S. court, if a
removal is not requested. We have touched on it. In our hypothetical, we have some
U.S. citizens involved in the action and the U.S. judge is certainly going to realize
that, if Mexican law applies, the U.S. citizens may receive considerably smaller
damages than they would if American law had applied. The judge may not feel as
reluctant to give Mexicans considerably lower damages than American law would
give because Mexicans would receive the damages that are customary to them. Do
we have a consensus that we would move to apply Mexican law?
JIMENEZ: In the tort action, I would have no hesitation in arguing that Mexican
law should apply. The benefits for Growfast and Growmex are just too great. First,
contributory negligence is a total bar to recovery' s and there are very few tort
actions in the United States where you don't find that the plaintiff had some degree
of responsibility. Second, as far as damages are concerned, they are going to be far

17. See Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. Inc., 179 F.3d 1279 (1Ith Cir. 1999).
18. See, infra, Francisco Velisuez. Preview of Problems in Product Liability: U.S. and Mexico.
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less because in Mexico damages for pain and suffering are not awarded and that,
typically, is the major portion of any U.S. damage award. Third, you are less likely
to be hit with punitive damages if Mexican law were to apply.
On the contract action, to the extent that the economic loss doctrine is going to
help Growfast and limit the amount of recovery strictly to the contractual damages,
or what was agreed to, and to the extent that that is not a benefit in Mexico, it may
be better that U.S. law is applied.
LOPERENA: In the contract case, even if it is tried in the United States or in
Mexico the applicable law would be Texas law, without any doubt. From a practical
point of view, judges are reluctant to apply a foreign law because it is unknown law
to them. Most of the motions to apply Mexican law, in my experience, have been
rejected by the courts because the judge feels more comfortable applying his own
law than looking to expert witnesses for foreign law. One expert says it is white and
the other says it is black, trapping the American judge in two different and opposite
versions of what Mexican law is.
GORDON: Mexican law accepts a choice of law. U.S. law accepts a choice of
law. Our hypothetical contract states the law of Texas applies. What is the law of
Texas--the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or the Convention on the
International Sale of Goods (CISG)'9 ?
SANTOS: It's the CISG, quite simply.
GORDON: Do you think the judges are going to agree with that?
SANTOS: Actually, no. Lawyers need to do a very good job at briefing the
judges. However, even so, the judges sometimes ignore the briefing and go down
a path you never thought they would.
GORDON: It may well be that the parties in drafting this contract had never
heard of the CISG. Until fairly recently we have not been very good at teaching it,
so many practitioners don't know to use it. Are some practitioners gaining an
advantage by being aware of the CISG?
SANTOS: Yes, it is a tremendous advantage. Sometimes you retroactively look
at the whole scenario and find out you have just gotten a bonanza. The CISG
provides an even broader, more common sense approach to business practices and
commercial relationships that even the UCC does. The UCC has tried to emulate a
lot of what had become customary in the marketplace. The CISG takes that a few
steps further, particularly recognizing international business transactions.
GORDON: One hundred civil judges in Florida were surveyed as to whether a
law of Florida provision would lead in their court to application of the CISG or the
UCC. About 30% responded, "What is the CISG?'"Almost all of the rest responded
that the UCC would apply. None of them said they would apply the CISG. A big
educational process is needed to instruct people that the CISG is indeed law. Every
contract that crosses borders between parties of the convention is to be governed by
the CISG. It is extraordinarily important. However, there is an opt out provision2'
which raises the question whether a provision for the application of the law of
Texas constitutes an opt out. The implication of that would be that the drafters
really meant the UCC of Texas. It's ambiguous.

19. See CISG, supra note 4.
20. See CISG, art. 95.
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SANTOS: Yes, it needs to be drafted clearly and unequivocally. The CISG is
very clear; you must opt out expressly.
JIMENEZ: In at least one arbitration, the arbitrator determined that the use of
the language "the law of the State of New Mexico shall apply," actually
incorporated the CISG, so therefore, the CISG was applicable.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/STEPHENSON: John Stephenson. I believe that unless
you expressly exclude it, if you use the Texas UCC as governing law, then you
automatically have included the CISG. By simply stating a choice of law of a
particular country or state, you don't exclude the CISG.
LOPERENA: If you are discussing whether American or Mexican law would
apply, it is a false conflict. In both cases the CISG would apply, because it is
considered part of both legal systems. In our hypothetical, it was a sale of goods
contract entered by nationals of two state parties to the convention. If it is not
expressly excluded, the convention applies. However, the CISG is not applicable
to death or bodily injuries caused by the goods that were the subject matter of the
sale. It applies only to the material damages.
GORDON: Since we have, in a sense, a false conflict, would a Mexican court
be likely to interpret the CSIG in the same way as a U.S. court? Would they turn
to the same sources of law? If we say it's a false conflict, then we are essentially
saying it doesn't matter what court it is in, or what law will apply, because it is the
CISG. How would a Mexican court approach an interpretation of the CISG?
LOPERENA: Of course, the Mexican court would apply the CSIG with the
Mexican criteria and Mexican way of interpretation. The loop-holes of the CISG
would be governed by Mexican precedents and Mexican judicial criteria. I think it
would be the same in any civil law country. The manner every national court
interprets the Convention would be fair. It would be an international convention that
would be applied in Mexico with Mexican criteria.
GORDON: Would a Mexican judge look at American case law?
LOPERENA: They don't even look to Mexican case law.
GORDON: Would an American judge look to Mexican case law as well as
American case law?
SANTOS: In fact, I think an American judge would have to look to German
case law and German interpretations, because there is so little American case law.
Germany has been interpreting the CISG or it's predecessor for 30 years or more.
Often lawyers come in and brief the judges on the UCC, which perhaps can be
helpful, but if the facts of the case are different it could be a real trap for everybody.
GORDON: Pace University has a web site to which it is very useful to direct
judges. They are trying to give abstracts of foreign cases as well as to collect
foreign cases in their totality. It may be true that a Mexican court would not go back
to past decisions dealing with interpretation. In that case, I could see a situation
where there is a Mexican decision that favors the U.S. party and the U.S. judge
would use that Mexican decision more than a Mexican judge would.
LOPERENA: In Mexico we have no precedent regarding the interpretation of
the CISG. We also need to educate the Mexican courts and bar. In some cases where
the contract has a choice of law clause providing for the application of Mexican
law, the lawyers would invoke the Mexican statute and not the Convention, because
they don't know that the Convention is applicable. It is too recent a development.
Of course, it they are familiar with the CISG, they can argue that the contract is
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governed by it, but if the Mexican law is more favorable to the case, the Mexican
lawyer could intentionally invoke the Mexican codes, instead of the CISG. If the
judge and defendant are not familiar with the Convention, everything could be
governed by Mexican law without taking into consideration the CISG. Furthermore,
the CISG must have been in force in both countries when the contract is signed in
order to be applicable.
GORDON: As for the tort, the applicable law in the United States would be state
law. The law applicable to the contract in the absence of the CISG would be state
law. Could you outline the Mexican system?
LOPERENA: Commercial law is federal and is applicable throughout the
country. Therefore, a case with a cause of action under the C6digo de Commercio
(the commercial code) will be subject to federal law.
GORDON: For the commercial matter then, it really doesn't make much
difference whether we were talking about Veracruz or Mexico City. But what about
tort law? Will it make any difference whether the action is in Veracruz or in
Mexico City?
LOPERENA: Torts are governed by local law. However, the rules of tort law
in the civil court for the State of Veracruz would be pretty much the same as those
in Mexico City, since the states basically copy the local laws of the Mexico City
federal district.2' There are situations that give rise to liability where for one party
it is a civil relation, but a commercial relation for another. Therefore, we must look
at whether to apply the civil code, which is different for each state, although most
of them track the C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal, the Civil Code for Mexico
City, or to apply the Commercial Code which is federal and uniform throughout the
country. The Commercial Code may be applied because one of the parties is a
merchant, such as in our hypothetical where defendant is a merchant. Article 1050
of the Commercial Code' states that, in accordance with the commercial
provisions, for one of the parties in a transaction it has a commercial nature and for
the other it has a civil nature. The controversy arising from that transaction will be
governed in accordance with commercial provisions. The Commercial Code would
apply and the loopholes in it will be filled in with the Civil Code for the Federal
District.
GORDON: We have as many different civil codes as we have states in Mexico,
plus we have the Civil Code for the Federal District in ordinary matters and for the
entire republic's federal matters. Which law would apply to this? Since the
explosion took place in Veracruz and the company has headquarters in Mexico City,
would it be the Federal District Civil Code or the Veracruz Civil Code?
LOPERENA: If you are suing in Veracruz, of course it would be the Veracruz
Civil Code. However, if you are suing in Mexico City, the judge will probably apply
the Civil Code for the Federal District. Technically speaking, it should be
Veracruz. But from a practical point of view, the law of the locus of the court.

21. Currently, the C6digo Civil para ci Distrito Federal and the Mexico City federal district civil code are
identical. However, in the near future, the Mexico City civil code will be replaced by a local version being
reviewed by the Mexico City congress, at which time the two codes will no longer be identical.
22. See COD.COM., art. 1050: "Cuando conforme a las disposiciones mercantiles, para una de las partes
que intervienen en un acto, dste tenga naturalesa comercial y parm Iaotra tenga naturaleza civil la controversia que
del mismo se derive se regird conforne a las leyes mercantiles."

U.S.-MEXCO LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

GORDON: But if a judge in the Federal District applied federal district law,
have you just federalized our tort applying the Federal District code to it even
though it took place in Veracruz?
LOPERENA: I don't think so. It would be federalized if you linked it to a
commercial activity, but perhaps it-is another false conflict, because most of the
local statutes mirror the Mexico City Civil Code for the Federal District.
IV.

DISCOVERY

AUDIENCE MEMBER/BROOKS:
Regarding a Texas court retaining
jurisdiction, how are you going to get your Mexican witnesses into the United
States?
GORDON: How do we get witnesses? Is there any way of forcing an American
court to get a witness to appear in the United States if the case is held in the United
States?
LOPERENA: No, I think the witness declaration should be taken through letters
rogatory by a Mexican court, because Mexico is a member of the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad23 and the Inter-American Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad.2 '
EPSTEIN: On the American pre-trial discovery side, the parties would be trying
to take the evidence of the Mexican witnesses under the Hague Evidence
Convention. The problem is that since Mexico does not recognize pretrial discovery
the way we do it here, we would have to see whether the discovery complied with
Article 23,' which is a kind of opt out provision for disclosure of documents. If the
foreign country does not recognize the so-called American system with full
disclosure of documents, it can impose conditions on the disclosure of documents.
Mexico has a reservation which allows for limited production of documents. So
you would have to narrow your requests and ask for specified documents. If you ask
for too much, you could get nothing at all. I advise people to hire a Mexican lawyer,
who would help you style the request to make sure that you conform with the
Mexican system.
On the examination of witnesses through the convention, if it is compulsory
testimony, it would have to be done through the court. The court would ask the
questions; it would be a procedure totally different from an American one. I
understand that at least some Mexican judges would allow the attorney for the other
side to be present and maybe ask supplemental questions, but that's probably within
the discretion of the Mexican judge. If it is voluntary taking of evidence, you can
take an American-style deposition before the American consulate.
JIMENEZ: We have found a way to avoid surprise from witnesses that just turn
up at the time of trial and may circumvent the very onerous process that you

23. See Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters [the Hague Convention], 8 LLM. 37 (1969).
24. See Inter-American Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad [the Inter-American Convention],
24 May 1984. 24 .M 472 (1984). The United States is not a party to this Convention.
25. See Hague Convention, art. 23: "A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or
accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery
of documents as known in Common Law countries."
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sometimes have to go through to get discovery abroad. That is to ask the court to
restrict any witness from appearing at trial unless they appear for deposition well
beforehand. Generally, judges are willing to do that, though some are not. There is
a fairness issue involved, because here you have a plaintiff who is seeking recovery
based on all these foreign witnesses.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/ROGERS: John Rogers. If there are documents in the
possession of the Mexican company, Growmex, which are not in the possession of
the U.S. company, Growfast, can you tell the U.S. parent company to obtain the
documents from the Mexican company for disclosure in the United States?
EPSTEIN: I think that depends on the inter-relationship between the two
companies. If you can show that the parent controls the subsidiary, then you could
compel the production of the documents through the parent. But then, if you were
able to do that, your argument would be that the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure apply, and not the Mexican rules, and you can do whatever is permitted
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Of course, if the subsidiary is a party
to the U.S. case and there is no jurisdictional problem, again the Federal Rules of6
Civil Procedure would apply. The Supreme Court said in the Aerospatiale case
that, if the U.S. court has jurisdiction over the party, even if it is a foreign party,
federal rules apply and the Hague Evidence Convention is not exclusive, just a
supplemental or optional way of getting evidence.
GORDON: We are almost on the fringe of blocking laws. It would seem that, if
we were to add a clause in the complaint and made it say a RICO action or anything
that provided for treble damages, then we may find Mexico reacting. I don't know
whether there is a blocking law in Mexico. I know there is a law that counters the
Helms Burton Act and the extensive extraterritorial application of that law, but
many other nations have passed blocking laws because of the extensive anti-trust
litigation that included companies abroad and requested treble damages. They have
essentially said to the American subsidiary abroad, you may not send any
documents back. France carried it a step further and made it a crime to ask for those
documents. Some nations have passed what we call claw-back provisions. If there
is a treble damage judgment awarded in the United States that is against a foreign
company, that foreign company may take back the treble damages from any assets
which the plaintiff might have present in the other country. Has Mexico gone to any
blocking laws that would prohibit the transfer of documentation and evidence to a
U.S. court?
LOPERENA: I don't think there is a prohibition, but there is an obligation in
principle to follow the orders of a foreign court regarding discovery, if the case is
not transferred to a Mexican court, according to either evidence convention.
However, in my experience, a client will volunteer all the documentation to a U.S.
court if he is the one who has asked for discovery, even though they are not used to
sending documents to the court. According to the Mexican Commercial Code,
documents should be inspected in the office of the merchant.
In addition, another way to take depositions in Mexico is, if the witnesses are
employees of the plaintiff or the defendant, even though they are abroad, there is no

26. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Counfor the Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 529, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 2548 (1987).
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need for the letters rogatory to take the witnesses' depositions. Often, if the
witnesses are volunteering, they appear before the court reporter who comes to
Mexico and takes oaths, and American courts are accepting the depositions. I have
attended depositions in cases in the United States and depositions taken in law firms
in Mexico, but it could be safer to take them in American consulates, because the
extraterritoriality of the foreign consulates and embassies could apply. When you
apply American law, you take an oath that may lead you to perjury under American
law, because you did it in the American territory of an embassy or of a consulate.
Mexico took several interpretative declarations and reservations when it signed
the Inter-American Convention and, I believe, there are also reservations in the
Hague Convention. Mexico does not want the intervention of foreign agents to take
evidence and they are not allowed to take any compulsory measures on Mexican
residents or nationals. However, we accept the taking of evidence abroad through
courts or even through diplomatic or consulate agents, as long as they do not use
any compulsory measures.
V.

DAMAGES

GORDON: Thinking about damages, I suppose that if Mexican law provides
extremely low damages, Growfast doesn't really much care if it is found liable as
a corporation. Growfast or Growmex will simply write a check. It appears that there
are limitations on damages so I think we ought to look at them. We have heard that
the Veracruz statute is probably very much like the Federal District statute. Article
1910 in the Civil Code for the Federal District says: "Whoever in acting illegally
or against good customs causes injury to another, is obliged to repair it," and then
the next clause, which Quintana Roo has eliminated, continues "unless he proves
that the injury occurred as the consequence of the fault or inexcusable negligence
of the victim."'27 I think we find that kind of liability provision, not only in Mexico,
but throughout much of the civil law world.
The next question is whether or not we will find the same damage provision in
the Federal District and Veracruz. There are two damage provisions. Article 1915
is the restoration for injury or compensatory damages, and Article 1916 is the
mysterious world of moral damages, mysterious to American lawyers at least. Many
have tried to equate it with punitive damages. But in 1982, the Federal District made
modifications to Article 1916 and I don't find any maximum on moral damages in
the current Civil Code.
LOPERENA: There is no limit on moral damages and it is not necessary that
material damage is caused. The material damage could be very low and the moral
damage could be one-half million pesos (or more), which is around $50,000, if the
defendant is wealthy.
GORDON: Could the language of Article 1916 result in a award of
$25,000,000?
LOPERENA: In a case, yes. I have advised my children, if you are going to be
injured by a car, please choose a Rolls Royce because they will pay you more.

27. C.C.D.F., supra.
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GORDON: What about Veracruz? We don't have the Veracruz statute, but how
do you suppose the Veracruz moral damage provision reads?
LOPERENA: If it is as it was in the Mexico City civil code before 1982, first
it will state that moral damages will not be awarded without material damage, and
second, the amount will be capped at 25 Mexican pesos, which is about $2.50.11
Also, it must be proportionate to the material damage. The Civil Code in the federal
district was amended to remove any ceiling on moral damages. Thus, they could be
$25,000,000, if you have enough evidence of the victim's circumstances, the fault
and wealth of the defendant, and the details of the case. Moral damages has to do
with feelings, affections, beliefs, decorum, honor, reputation, private life, character
and physical aspects or how one is perceived in the opinions of others. The courts
have said that it is not necessary to prove the real damage, such as how your beliefs
were harmed, just the illicit behavior of the one who caused the damage, because
the moral damage is something internal to the individual.
GORDON: Then it seems that we should keep the case out of Mexico City. If
this is the only jurisdiction in Mexico that has the potential for extraordinarily high
damages, Growfast will want the matter in Veracruz or anywhere else where there
is a cap. To my knowledge, there isn't any other state that has yet followed the
Federal District.
LOPERENA: The Quintana Roo code mentions indemnification for moral
damage which will be fixed prudently by the judge taking into consideration the
harm elements of the moral assets, such as affection, honor, prestige, personal
integrity. In our hypothetical, the judge will fix the amount of the moral damage
taking into consideration how visible the injury is, the part of the body that was
injured, the sex, age, and activity of the victim, and some other special conditions.
There is no maximum amount and this applies to torts, contractual breach and strict
liability arising from the use of dangerous substances. There is also a civil law
cause of action of defamation for moral damages that arises from Article 1916.
GORDON: One more thing about the defamation case. If, because of the
limitation on damages in Mexico, the public official accused of bribery sues the
President of Growfast for defamation in the United States, this will raise the issue
of the First Amendment right of free speech. If the U.S. court agrees to apply
Mexican law of defamation, is that in essence a ruling that the party has essentially
waived his rights or that the party has been denied his free speech rights under U.S.
law? What happens in that case?
JIMENEZ: I think this particular case highlights the difficulty that a U.S. court
is going to have in applying foreign law, in this case Mexican law. All of a sudden
you need to explain to a judge what the law in Mexico is regarding defamation. At
one point, we searched and found not a single case where somebody actually
recovered monies on a civil cause of action based on defamation.
There was a famous Mexican case, I guess it was brought by the fighter Julio
Cesar Chavez where he claimed $25,000,000 (US) based on a report that came out
in the newspaper, Financiero. Basically the court found in his favor but gave him

28. The provision in the Civil Code for the Federal District before 1982 stated 25,000 pesos, but with the
revaluation of the peso, it would now be 25 pesos.
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no damages. Instead, it applied the Law of Printing 9 which provides for a retraction
and a publication of Cesar Chavez' account of the truth. I think we are going to start
seeing more cases like this in the United States because information is no longer
limited by borders. Now information flows both ways. Also, it is difficult to even
claim there is a civil cause of action for defamation. Article 1916 of the Civil Code
is perhaps where you can anchor such a civil cause, because it doesn't expressly
exempt journalists. On a practical level, you may find that a U.S. judge is going to
read Article 1916 and say it doesn't apply to journalists. In a battle of the experts,
it is would be very difficult.
The other issue is public policy. In Mexico, defamation is a crime covered by
Articles 350 and 351 of the Penal Code for the Federal District' ° and, as I
understand it, it is also treated as a crime under the Law of Printing. Under the
Penal Code, you could be subject to up to two years of incarceration if you are
guilty of defamation. In applying the moral damages statutes, you have to prove two
things: first, an illicit act and, second, that you sustained damages. While the illicit
act is defamation, the only place that defamation is defined or explained to any
extent is in the Penal Code. The plaintiff asks a judge to apply this Penal Code,
which says that defamation occurs whenever you dishonor anyone, whether what
you say is true or not true, determined or undetermined."
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
That is a real problem for a U.S. court because you are now going against the
First Amendment. There was a decision in 1997 in Maryland, Telnikoff v.
Matusevitch 2 in which a Maryland court would not enforce a judgment that was
obtained in England because it found that the law of defamation in England violated
U.S. public policy, simply because the law of England presumed that the statement
that was made was true and it's the plaintiffs responsibility to state otherwise.
That's a real problem. If the plaintiff is not required to prove falsity, you have a real
problem.
Also, in the United States, you have to prove fault. There has to be some
standards, some burden that you have to prove. This is a safeguard that is provided
by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. So a U.S. judge again is going to
have a difficult time reconciling U.S. law and U.S. Constitutional principles with
Mexico's law for defamation. The problem is that the plaintiff in this particular case
is asking the judge to set precedent because there is no precedent for finding a civil

29. See generally Ley de Imprenta.
30. See C.P.D.F., arts. 350 and 351. Art. 350 provides:
"... La difamaci6n consiste: en cominicar dolosamente a una o ns personas la imputaci6n que
hace a otra persona fisica. o persona moral en los casos previstos por la ley, de un hecho cierto
o falso, determinado o indeterminado, que pueda causarle deshonra, descrddito, perjuicio, o
exponerlo al deprecio de alguien...."
31. Under C.P.D.P., art. 351, the person accused of defaming may not defend himself by proving the truth
of the statement except in two cases: 1) when the person defamed was engaged in public work and the statement
related to the performance of his functions; and 2) when the fact ascribed is found certain by an irrevocable
decision and the person accused acted for reasons ofpublic interest, or for a private but legitimate interest, without
any intention of doing harm.
32. 347 Md. 561, 702 A.2d 230 (1997).
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remedy that awards damages based on the Mexican moral damages statute. It
smacks of being inappropriate in that particular case.
If the law is not defined as to what constitutes defamation, if it is just anything
that causes dishonor but with no standards to apply, a U.S. judge is at a loss. What
the plaintiff in a case I dealt with did was urge the court to graft on the First
Amendment protections. They were asking the judge to forget Mexican law and just
apply U.S. law, even though the conflict of law analysis clearly maintained that the
proper law in this particular dispute was Mexican law. I think we are going to start
finding that kind of difficulty in the area of tort in general. U.S. judges will maintain
a set way of applying law; it's very alien to them to try to apply it any other way.
It is very difficult to educate a judge in a different judicial system.
GORDON: It really was, I think, very difficult for this judge and in many ways
Growfast didn't try to make it any easier for him. I think one major point that Mr.
Jimenez makes is that if you can in any way relate a tort to a crime and then get
Mexican law to apply, bringing in the principle that U.S. courts don't enforce
foreign criminal law would put a defendant in a pretty good position. Defamation
is criminal throughout the world. The government would step in when a person was
dishonored and Mexico still takes that pretty seriously as a criminal matter in
Article 350 of the Penal Code. By bringing that in, the court begins to worry that
they may be applying Mexican criminal law. So Growfast puts the plaintiffs in a
difficult position where Growfast is going to get all the benefits of U.S.
Constitutional protection but still gets Mexican law to apply and Mexican damage
law to apply, which it hopes is going to be rather nominal.
However, there is still a problem of whether you have waived your First
Amendment rights. For example, let's say that we published a Spanish edition of
Time magazine and it ends up in Mexico. The magazine has a very critical story
about somebody in Mexico, who brings a suit. I don't think the fact that it found its
way into a Spanish speaking country constitutes a waiver of all constitutional rights,
no matter where a defamation case might have been brought. But I think if we had
published a Mexican edition in Spanish and had targeted that country, we would be
much more likely to find that the court holds we have waived our constitutional
protection. Do you agree?
JIMENEZ: I agree. The U.S. courts would have to deal with imposing a law that
it might consider to be violating U.S. public policy, even though there is a waiver.
LOPERENA: Why is it said that this exception is to protect the media and the
journalists? It is because it says that there shall be an obligation to repair moral
damage by a person who has exercised his rights of opinion, criticism, expression
or informing according to the terms and limitations of Articles 6 and 7 of the
General Constitution of the Mexican Republic. That means it is part of the Bill of
Rights. Article 6 mentions freedom of speech and Article 7 establishes freedom of
the press. If I am exercising a right granted to me by the Bill of Rights, I cannot be
considered as acting illicitly. So, if you are protected by the Bill of Rights, you are
not acting against the law. Whatever the secondary law provides, the Constitution
prevails, of course, over all laws in Mexico.
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ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT

GORDON: Let's move on to some of the matters that deal with enforcing a
judgment, one of which is whether or not you would, in the actions brought in
Mexico, recommend that Growfast ignore the suits, leaving the defense and liability
to Growmex. We already have concluded that Mexico probably does not have a law
piercing the corporate veil. I think we have probably addressed that enough because
it seems to me that if we believe that Mexico has no jurisdiction over Growfast and
Growfast does not enter an appearance, we may not have to worry very much about
the judgment. Would you recommend to Growfast and Growmex that they ignore
the suit in Paris, France, on the basis of their jurisdiction, which seems a little
strange to us. The Parisian tourist in Mexico is injured, goes back to Paris, and
initiates a suit in the Court of First Instance in Paris against Growfast. Would you
appear in that one?
EPSTEIN: I would appear on behalf of Growfast and contest jurisdiction. If you
are talking about potential enforcement in the United States of a French judgment,
even where there is a lack of personal jurisdiction, the American courts are very
liberal about the enforcement of default judgments. If you don't appear, you run the
risk that it could be enforced in the United States. However, if you show that you
have appeared and strongly contested jurisdiction, I would say that there is little
likelihood under the facts presented that a U.S. court would enforce a judgment
from France. Then, I am not an expert on the Brussels Convention, but perhaps
that's the one that is in effect in the European Union countries. It is possible that if
ajudgment were obtained against Growfast and Growmex in France, they could try
to enforce it in another country in Europe where Growfast might have assets under
the Brussels or the Lugano Conventions.33
GORDON: I think that's critical. The Brussels Convention has a whole series
of extraordinary jurisdiction listings in Article 3 which provides that no member of
the Convention is required to enforce a judgment which is based on personal
jurisdiction in one of the ways listed. For France, it lists this form of personal
jurisdiction based on domicile.' For Germany, although they have now changed
it, it listed the jurisdiction based on assets. Remember the famous case of Jean
Claude Killy who left a pair of underpants in a hotel and that was considered to be
enough of an asset located in Germany for an unlimited judgment. Now the problem
is that if Growfast has no assets in France but a lot of assets in England, the
Convention allows England to enforce a judgment of France if it is against a third
nation, a non-Convention nation. They could not enforce it if it were an English
company. But they would enforce it if it's a company of a country which is not a
party to the Convention. The Convention also allows any one of the members of the

33. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Official J.E.C., July 28, 1990, 29 LLM. 1413 (1990); te Lugano Convention, 1988, Official J.E.C. (L. 319) 9,
Sept. 16, 1988, 28 LLM. 620 extends the provisions of the Brussels convention to Iceland, Norway, and
Switzerland.
art. 3:
34. See id.,
Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State
only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 6 of this Title. In particular, the following
provisions shall not be applicable as against them ....- in France: Articles 14 and 15 of the
civil code (Code Civil).
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Convention to enter into an agreement with a non-Convention member party to deny
enforcement on the basis of those extraordinary jurisdictions. We have had
discussions with England on such an agreement and they have failed, because a lot
of other things were brought into the negotiations. I guess we all feel that telling
anybody not to enter any kind of an appearance at all is a pretty dangerous thing to
do.
JIMENEZ: I would agree. This is another example in which we should be
careful not to just instinctively fight, because we may be better off in litigating this
case in France than anywhere else because of French law, damage caps and so forth.
LOPERENA: It is what I call over-litigation. When you over-litigate a case and
object to everything, sometimes you object to something that is favorable to you.
EPSTEIN: Also, in terms of France, I don't think you would have to stick around
there to litigate the entire case. I think if you just contest jurisdiction, and show that
you are appearing for that reason and then leave, that would be sufficient to prevent
the judgment from being enforced in the United States.
GORDON: What if there is an appearance, you lose on the jurisdiction issue and
go home, and then there is a judgment issued on the merits. Then that judgment is
brought to the United States to be enforced. Won't an American court enforce that
judgment? There is a Pennsylvania case involving a breach of contract claim in
England where the English court said, maybe you didn't get very good advice in
coming over here to contest the jurisdiction. Under English law, if you contest the
jurisdiction and lose on that, it is considered that you have entered a general
appearance.33 Isn't there a danger of this? If you lose on the jurisdiction issue, are
you suggesting that you stay and contest the merits in France?
EPSTEIN: Well, you have kind of a devil's choice there because if you leave
and do nothing, then as I said before, I think there is a risk that it's a default
judgment. It can just be enforced on that pure basis. However, if you stick around
just for the jurisdiction, I think you are on safer ground. Although as you say, the
whole issue is going to be re-litigated in the American court.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/ROGERS: John Rogers. If, on our facts, a default
judgment is obtained, let's say no appearance is made on behalf of Growfast in
Mexico, and default judgment is obtained nevertheless, because a Mexican judge
finds some basis for jurisdiction. Could a Mexican court find a basis for
jurisdiction? If a Mexican judgment is awarded nevertheless and is sought to be
enforced in the United States, what result?
GORDON: If Growfast decides not to appear, the Mexican courts have
jurisdiction over Growmex.
LOPERENA: If Growfast is served in the United States after a petition for a
Mexican action and Growfast does not appear in Mexico, the consequences of the
non-appearance is: first, it is considered to accept all of the facts of the complaint;
second, it will not be allowed to present evidence afterwards; third, if there are
assets belonging to Growfast in Mexico, the judge may decree an attachment of
assets; fourth, most likely it will receive an adverse judgment. I don't know if this
judgment would be enforceable abroad. IfI were attorney for Growfast I would say,

35. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gun Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
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if you were duly served in the United States and if you have assets in Mexico, don't
fail to answer the complaint in Mexico. If you are absolutely sure that the judgment
won't be enforceable in the United States, don't appear before the judge. But, to
appear just to challenge jurisdiction is a mistake. If you challenge jurisdiction and
you lose, you must continue the litigation. If Growfast has assets in Mexico, I would
never leave the case without answering the complaint, because the case will be
judged by default of Growfast and only if there is one defense posed by Growmex
and it is considered precedent maybe both companies will be acquitted. But it could
be the case that the Mexican company is acquitted and the American company not.
So I believe you will have judgment against your company that could be
enforceable in the United States.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/ROGERS: Assuming no assets and no presence on the
part of Growfast in Mexico.
LOPERENA: I would leave the answer to that to the American lawyers
regarding the likelihood of enforcement of that Mexican judgment in the United
States. If there are no assets in Mexico, I wouldn't care about the judgment in
Mexico, because Mexico cannot enforce it if you have no assets there.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/ROGERS: You would advise Growfast not to appear
in the Mexican action.
LOPERENA: Just subject to the opinion of the American lawyers regarding the
enforcement in the United States.
SANTOS: I think it is becoming eminently clear that you need to always be fully
apprised of the law where you are going to tangle.
GORDON: Correct me if I am wrong. If plaintiffs have sued Growmex and
Growfast in Mexico and Growfast decides not to appear, there will be an immediate
default judgment against Growfast?
LOPERENA: Not immediately. The judgment would be the same. One of the
defendants is considered in default. But if the other answered the complaint, the
proceeding will go forward. The judgment will be the same, but in one case a judge
could consider that Growfast is liable and Growmex is not because Growfast did not
appear to defend itself.
GORDON: But does it matter? Assume the case goes on and Growmex wins on
the liability issue of Growmex. Growmex has now won and is not liable, but
Growfast refused to enter an appearance and there is a default judgment rendered
against Growfast. If someone executes on Growfast's assets in Mexico, it is
Growmex.
LOPERENA: No, the assets of Growfast are the shares of Growmex and if the
shares are in the United States, it is a problem to attach them. There is a provision
in Article 20 of the General Law of Negotiable Instruments and Credit Operations36
that applies to stock certificates that requires you to have, physically, the attachment
of the stock certificates in order to consider that the shares are attached. I recently
had a case where the clerk of the court attached stock certificates without having
physical possession of them. The defendants challenged the attachment before the

36. See Ley General de Tnruosy Operac ones de Credito [L-T.O.C.]. Art 20: "El secuestro cualesquicra
otros vfnculos sobre el derecho consignado en el fftulo, o sobre las mercancfas por 01representadas, no surtiran
efectos sino comprenden eltftulo mismo."
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judge, who said that the attachment was valid. The defendant then went to the court
of appeals, who affirmed that the attachment was valid. The defendant went to the
district court in amparo,37 which denied the amparoto the defendant. Finally, the
defendant challenged the decision of the district court by appeal to the circuit court,
which has the last word that establishes resjudicata.The Circuit Court annulled the
attachment on the shares because the share certificates were not physically attached.
So, if the plaintiffs don't obtain physical possession of the stock certificates, they
will never attach the Growfast assets, namely Growmex. There is another thing. In
the hypothetical case, Growfast and Growmex would be jointly liable. According
to the Civil Code of Mexico, if one of the jointly liable parties is acquitted, the other
jointly liable party is acquitted as well because they have the same relation. If one
pays the debt, it's extinguished for all of them. If one is acquitted, the debt is
acquitted for everybody. So, if Growmex wins, Growfast most likely will also win.
EPSTEIN: On the U.S. side, I have to repeat myself. It sounds somewhat farfetched. But to be on the safe side, if I were Growfast, I would hire a Mexican
lawyer, see what kind of a special appearance I can make, if that is possible, to
contest jurisdiction. Ithink that is safer than not appearing and then running the risk
that a default judgment is going to be entered and enforced.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/ROGERS: But then we go back to the question, is it
possible to enter that kind of limited appearance? Can Growfast challenge
jurisdiction in Mexico without submission if it loses.
LOPERENA: In Mexico, it is considered that you have submitted to jurisdiction,
implicitly or expressly, in several circumstances. If you appear to answer the
complaint or to file a counterclaim, you have submitted implicitly. You have
submitted expressly if you sign a document where you submit to the Mexican court.
But you have the opportunity, you have the right to challenge jurisdiction and you
are not considered to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. So, if you
challenge jurisdiction and you lose, what is the best advice? To go on with the
defense of the case. In practical terms, you have to challenge jurisdiction at the time
of answering the complaint on the merits, so we don't have two steps like you have
in the United States. If you challenge jurisdiction in the United States, you have to
wait until the jurisdiction question is resolved by the court and then if you lose the
jurisdiction issue you have to answer the complaint. But, in Mexico you answer the
complaint and you challenge jurisdiction in the same brief.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/ROGERS: The risk seems to be that if you challenge
jurisdiction and you lose, then you are stuck. Then you have to continue, because
you have already answered the complaint.
LOPERENA: Yes, but you may argue in the United States that you are not
subject to the Mexican court's jurisdiction. Although you answered on the merits,
you did it because it was your duty to do it. But you didn't want to be tried by a
Mexican court and, although you objected to the jurisdiction, the Mexican court

37. Amparo is used to protect rights deemed infringed by a legal ordinance or state action. To oversimplify
a complex legal doctrine, amparo is a type of judicial proceeding by which an aggrieved party may challenge the
acts, decisions, or omissions of state authority, including all branches of government, but usually only after all
ordinary means of redress have been exhausted or are not available. It is typically used as a means of appealing
lower court decisions. See 1997 WL 685237, *7 (West). For further reference, see. e.g., Bruce Zagaris. The
Amparo Process in Mexico, 6 U.S.-MEX. .J,61 (1998) and other articles therein.
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assumed jurisdiction. When you have the enforcement issue abroad, you can argue
that you never submitted to the foreign court's jurisdiction and the outcome is
subject to foreign law.
EPSTEIN: I agree with that. If you set forth the Mexican procedure, you show
that you had to go so far and then you got out. I think you have fully protected your
interest.
JIMENEZ: Basically, I think the key is that you want a record that you contested
jurisdiction. The risk is that if you do not contest jurisdiction, when enforcement
time comes in the United States, the court may find that you waived jurisdiction.
That is what you are trying to avoid, so there should be a record of objecting to the
jurisdiction of that forum.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/ROGERS:
Isn't there some minimum level of
notification that would have to be made? If there are no assets, no presence of
Growfast in Mexico?
EPSTEIN: Or if they named Growfast in the Mexican litigation, Growfast would
have to be served properly in accordance with the Inter-American Convention on
Letters Rogatory,3" of which both countries are members. If there is not proper
service of process, that's a defense to the enforcement action in the United States.
AUDIENCE MEMBER/BAUMAN: How long does it normally take a Mexican
court to determine in the first instance whether there is jurisdiction?
LOPERENA: Probably a couple of months. Let me describe the procedure for
the jurisdiction issues. It is the same in commercial cases as in civil cases, at least
in Mexico City. If you are served with a complaint in Mexico, you have nine
working days to answer the complaint. If you are served in the United States, you
will be entitled to an extension of time because of the distance. That is why, when
I am granted a power of attorney, I always ask my foreign clients to expressly limit
the power of attorney not to be able to receive service of summonses in order to
obtain the extension of time to answer the complaint. I prefer for my foreign clients
to be served in their own country, for instance, in France, which will give me 90
extra days to answer. That allows me to travel to Paris or my client to Mexico to
review all the documents needed for the defense.
When you answer the complaint, you challenge jurisdiction. The judge does not
stay the proceedings. He goes on with the proceedings even though there has been
a challenge of jurisdiction. The challenge of jurisdiction is resolved by the court of
appeals. Certified copies of all the documents of the lower court are sent to the
court of appeals, which tries the jurisdictional issue. If you are the one objecting to
the jurisdiction, you don't have to file any extra arguments. As it is a point of law,
the court of appeals analyzes the case in a month, maybe a month-and-a-half, and
they rule on jurisdiction. If the challenge is accepted, the case is dismissed. If it is
rejected, the case is over and you can challenge it before a federal district judge
through an amparo. It would take more than two months, maybe three, before the
decision of the district court. Then, the appeal to the circuit court could take
between a month and five months. But if the court of appeals approves your motion
of lack of jurisdiction, the case is over and the plaintiff would be the one to
challenge the jurisdiction issue before the supreme court directly.
38. See OAS Treaty Series, No. 43, reprinted in 14 LLM. 339 (1975).
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AUDIENCE MEMBER/BAUMAN: Let's take this hypothetical case where you
may have 90 days before you have to answer the complaint in the foreign court. Has
anybody ever considered going into a U.S. court and stating that you have an issue
that is ripe for declaratory judgment and the issue is whether or not this foreign
court could exercise jurisdiction over you?
GORDON: There is a case that is pretty close to that which dealt with a
Japanese company in America that was sued in a product liability case and they
refused to enter an appearance and immediately filed in a Japanese court for a
declaratory judgment as to their liability. They didn't file a petition to deny
enforcement of any judgment that might be rendered but they asked for a decision
that would clearly be a conflicting decision with any finding of liability in the
United States. They received that decision and it put a kind of chilling affect on the
American case. 39 It was never enforced in Japan. I think that is an interesting
question.
EPSTEIN: There is a recent district court decision where someone filed an
action for declaratory judgment that a foreign judgment would not be enforceable.'
The purpose was to try and stop the foreign action from proceeding. I remember that
the case was dismissed.
GORDON: I think the U.S. court would be very reluctant to deal with the
foreign case and say we won't enforce that judgment, whatever it is. I think you
really have to make your case a separate case that will then constitute a conflicting
substantive opinion with the other.
Let's raise one final question of the panelists. It's something that maybe in
another year we will have to explore. We know that Mexico will enforce U.S.
judgments. Mexico has changed its law to allow the enforcement of U.S.judgments.
It is a federal rule. Many states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money
Judgments Recognition Act. Mexico requires reciprocity. Perez Nieto Castro4 1 says
that reciprocity is satisfied if a State has adopted that Act. But I think the important
question right now is, are Mexican courts enforcing U.S. judgments and are
American courts enforcing Mexican judgments? Mr. Epstein has a very interesting
case that was handed out to you that addresses the second question.
EPSTEIN: In general, American courts are very liberal about enforcing foreign
judgments and you hear all the time that we are more liberal than foreign courts are
in enforcing American judgments for the reasons that we have discussed this
afternoon. They do not like the American system, jury awards, contingency fees,
punitive damages, in particular. But the Southwest Livestock case42 is an interesting
decision from Texas where a Texas court enforced a loan agreement. Actually, it
was the borrower who went into court to try and challenge the amount of interest
that was being assessed under this agreement with the Mexican party, about a fifty
percent interest rates. What they were saying was that the American court should

39. Deutsch v. West Coast Machinery Co., 80 Wash. 2d 707. 497 P.2d 1311 (1972); Kabushiki Kaisha
Kansai Tekkosho v. Marubeni-lida (America) Kaisha, 723 The Henmrijihe (JudicialReports) 76 (1974); Marubeni
American Corp. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Kansai Tekkoasho, 361 Henti Taimuzu (The Law Irunes Report) 127 (1978).
40. See Basic v. Fitzroy Engineering Ltd.. 132 F.3d 36 (7th Cir.(I11.) 1997).
41. See discussion in Comparative Perspectives on Private, Commercial Dispute Resolution: Canada,
Mexico and the United States. 7 FLk J. INT'L L 313,349 (1992).
42. Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 1999).
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not enforce any judgment from Mexico which would recognize this interest charge.
The argument was that it would violate Texas public policy against usury. The
public policy exception is one of the standard factors in any court considering the
enforcement of a foreign judgment. The U.S. District Court in Texas refused to
recognize the Mexican judgment as against public policy, even though the court
stated that the Mexican court had personal jurisdiction. Surprisingly, the Court of
Appeals ruled that you have to show under the factors in the state statute that the
cause of action itself violates public policy, not the judgment. The court said there
is nothing repugnant to the public policy of Texas about a cause of action based on
a promissory note. The parties freely entered into this contract, the borrower knew
the amount of interest that would be charged, there was no coercion, and the amount
of interest was allowable under Mexican law. Thus, the Court of Appeals enforced
the judgment applying the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act and
found no violation of public policy. I think that is an example of the liberal attitude
towards enforcing foreign judgments in this country.
With regard to the negotiations for a treaty on recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, the issue of punitive damages is one of the main stumbling
blocks. There will be a treaty eventually despite the debate over punitive damages,
but I think it is pretty clear that there is not going to be any bargaining about
punitive damages. It is going to be out. So, American judgments will be enforceable
in accordance with the rules of this Convention, but not the punitive damages part. 43
LOPERENA: Last April, there was a seminar at New York University,
organized by Professor Lowenfeld about the proposed Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments. I think there are a lot of
problems with this Convention. But the most important part, in my view, concerns
issues of jurisdiction, not issues of enforcement of judgments, because Mexico
enforces foreign judgments without many obstacles. The rules are very clear in the
Commerce Code, as well as in the Civil Procedure Code, and the Inter-American
Convention. The main problem is jurisdiction. I understand that American courts
are assuming jurisdiction on many factors that are unknown in Mexico. These long
arm statutes are very favorable for American courts to take jurisdiction over
Mexican nationals, Mexican residents, for acts which happened in Mexico.
I currently have a tort case in Mississippi. A Mexican boat was in Mexican
waters and allegedly caused damage to an American company. The U.S. Federal
Court in Mississippi assumed jurisdiction because the Mexican company, who was
the defendant, had some contracts in Mississippi absolutely unrelated to the facts
that gave rise to the action of the boat. But the American court said that U.S.
admiralty law was not applicable because the cause of action was on board a
Mexican vessel with a Mexican flag in Mexican waters, and was property of a
Mexican company. These issues of jurisdiction are very important and very
sensitive. I have another case today of an aircraft accident that occurred in Mexico,
with a Mexican company renting their craft, insured by a Mexican insurance
company. The Mexican insurance company was sued in the United States. The

43. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, adopted 30 Oct., 1999, by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law (visited on 5/3/00) <http//www.hcch.nt//conventions/draft36.e.hmil>.
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challenge to jurisdiction was not accepted by two Texas courts, one local and one
federal. It is very urgent that we have clear rules on jurisdiction because Mexican
rules on jurisdiction are in the statutes and the long arm statutes for American
courts are allowing them to assume jurisdiction over Mexican defendants without
any connection to the United States. I want to tell you that the victims in the aircraft
accident were Mexicans. The insurance company is Mexican. The airline, their
carrier, was Mexican. But, the aircraft was the property of an American company
and that is why the Texas courts are assuming jurisdiction for something that is
absolutely out of the United States because the defendant is the Mexican insurance
company.
GORDON: Assuming the jurisdiction is satisfactory to Mexico, are Mexican
courts enforcing American judgments?
LOPERENA: Yes, but the foreign judgement must have the character of res
judicatain the country in which it was issued, the action in which the judgment was
issued may not be the subject of pending litigation in Mexico between the same
parties, and the obligation which is to be performed may not be contrary to the
public policy of Mexico.'
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APPENDIX A
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION - INVOLVING CORPORATIONS
AND INDIVIDUALS FROM FRANCE, GERMANY, JAPAN, MEXICO, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
The following hypothetical is adapted from Folsom, Gordon & Spanogle,
International Business Transactions: A Problem Oriented Coursebook (4th Ed.
West Pub. Co. 1999)
THE HYPOTHETICAL
The Company
GROWFAST CHEMICALS, INC. (GROWFAST) is a Delaware chartered
corporation with principal administrative offices in Dallas. It has manufacturing
facilities in Texas. It also has a wholly owned subsidiary in Veracruz, Mexico
(GROWMEX, S.A.). GROWFAST manufactures many different pesticides and
fungicides used by commercial growers of ornamental plants. One of the fungicides
is SollateT. For nearly two decades SollateTi has been used extensively by
commercial and home growers of many tropical plants. It has long been considered
the only successful fungicide to control several serious fungi. Some of the
ingredients in SollateTM come from companies in England and Japan.
A. The Commercial Claims
GROWFAST has sold Sollate T throughout Latin America. Until recently all the
Sollate' sold in Latin America was manufactured in Texas and shipped direct.
Several years ago the Sollate' M which was sold to growers throughout Mexico
contained some chemicals poisonous to plants. The result was that many Mexican
commercial growers lost their entire stocks of ornamental plants. The SollateT
which caused the damage was purchased using standard documentary transactions,
and each included provisions that the goods were sold "as is, with all faults" and the
contract would be governed by the law of Texas. The name GROWFAST appeared
on the invoices. GROWFAST believes that SollateT was both mixed improperly
and misapplied by the growers in Mexico, and therefore that the growers are
responsible. Or at least that the force majeure should be applied to excuse
GROWFAST from responsibility. Assume that only the claims that are brought are
based on breach of contract grounds. While there may be product liability raising
tort/delict issues, product liability is the subject of the separate problem below. The
claims considered under this part of the problem address such contract issues as the
"suitability" of the delivered SollateTM .
B. The Tort Claims
Totally unrelated to the facts giving rise to the contract issues above, a serious
accident occurred at the GROWMEX, S.A. plant in Veracruz. This plant only
recently began to make SollateT.

While transferring SollateT concentrate,

obtained from the Texas plant, into vats for dilution and packaging, supervised by
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both Mexican employees and two technicians "on loan" from GROWFAST in
Texas, an unexplained explosion occurred. One of the U.S. technicians and 35
Mexican employees were killed. Serious injury was suffered by dozens of other
employees. The smoke from the explosion drifted over Veracruz and adjacent
towns, causing serious bums to several hundred more people, including a number
of foreign tourists (two US, one French, and one German citizen). A statement by
the president of GROWFAST made in Mexico City shortly after the accident
blamed the accident on corrupt Mexican government officials who demanded and
accepted payoffs during the plant construction, which resulted in contractors not
installing adequate safety walls in the dilution room. Unfortunately, the statement
was repeated in newspapers throughout Mexico and the United States. The
president apologized in a statement released by the company.
THE DISCUSSION
The Commercial Claims
A. ContractActions Initiatedin the UnitedStates
Some of the Mexican commercial growers which purchased the SollateT which
allegedly caused the loss of plants have sued GROWFAST in federal district court
in Brazoria, Texas.
B. ContractActions Initiated in Mexico
The remaining Mexican commercial growers which purchased the SollateT have
sued GROWFAST and GROWMEX in state court in Veracruz, and in federal court
in Mexico City. The GROWMEX plant is in the state of Veracruz, but the company
has offices in Mexico City.
THE TORT CLAIMS
A. Tort Actions Initiated in the United States
1. The two U.S. citizens who were tourists, and the personal representative of
the U.S. citizen who was a GROWFAST employee and who was killed in the plant
by the explosion, have filed suit against GROWFAST in state court in the south
Texas city where GROWFAST has a plant.
2. Some of the nearly 100 Mexicans (employees and area residents) who were
injured, and some of the representatives of the 35 who were killed, have filed suit
against GROWFAST in the same state court in south Texas.
3. A Mexican government official, who the president of GROWFAST suggested
had taken payoffs, has brought suit for defamation against GROWFAST and the
company's president in federal district court in Dallas, Texas.
4. The German tourist who was injured has filed a suit against GROWFAST in
the same state court in south Texas.
The above lawsuits filed in the United States all ask for the application of US
law, seek extensive discovery, request jury trials, and demand punitive damages.
They all have been filed by attorneys who have signed contingent fee contracts with
their clients.
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B. Tort Actions Initiated in Mexico
1. The remained of the nearly 100 Mexicans (employees and area residents) who
were injured and the remainder of the representatives of the 35 who were killed,
being the parties who did not file suit in Texas, have filed suit against GROWFAST
and GROWMEX, in Veracruz, Mexico. They have asked for compensatory
damages, and for moral damages in an amount which would be equivalent to
punitive damages in the United States.
2. Two other Mexican government officials with the same grievance against the
president of GROWFAST have brought a civil suit in Mexico asking for substantial
damages in dollars.
GROWFAST in Texas believes that the two companies in England and Japan
which had supplied some of the ingredients to manufacture Sollate 'T may be partly
responsible for the explosion and damages. GROWFAST nevertheless intends to
argue that the explosion was the fault of the Mexican employees who disobeyed
instructions given by the U.S. supervisors. The two companies from which
GROWFAST purchased the ingredients in England and Japan have both denied any
responsibility. But GROWFAST is prepared to bring a claim against both of these
foreign companies in federal district court in Texas.
3. Tort Action Initiated in France
1. The French Tourist who was injured has filed a suit against GROWFAST and
GROWMEX in the court of first instance in Paris, where the French plaintiff is
domiciled.
ISSUES RAISED BY THE VARIous ACTIONS

A. In the Commercialand Tort Actions in the United States
1. What is you thinking from a strategy perspective on attempting to remove
these suits to Mexico under the theory of forum non conveniens.
2. Are there any legal obstacles to such removal?
3. Would the court apply the same legal reasoning for such a removal request as
it would to a request to remove a matter from one state to another within the United
States? Would the courts be more likely to grant removal where the plaintiffs are
Mexican than where they are U.S. citizens? What about the German person who
was injured, shouldn't that be removed to Mexico, or at least Germany?
4.. If the courts refuse removal, do the facts provide enough to conclude that the
subject matter and personal jurisdiction requirements have been met?
5. Assume removal on forum non conveniens grounds is granted. But Mexico
has adopted a law that states when a Mexican plaintiff, with a choice of initiating
suit in Mexico or abroad, initiates the suit abroad, if there is a dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds that action may not thereafter be commenced in Mexico.
The plaintiffs apply to reinstate the case in Texas because there is no availableand
adequate forum in Mexico. What result?
6. Assuming removal is not requested, or if requested is not granted, should
GROWFAST ask the court to apply Mexican law? What are the considerations the
court is likely to face and wish to discuss before it rules on this choice of law issue?
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7. In proving Mexican law in the United States court, who would you seek as
experts? Who might the court prefer to have appear as experts?
8. If the U.S. court applies Mexican law, could it nevertheless grant punitive
damages?
9. If GROWFAST needs discovery in Mexico, what obstacles might it face?
10. If the commercial actions, if the court rules that U.S. law applies, what is the
source of that law?
11. In the same suits, if the court rules that Mexican law applies, what is the
source of that law?
12. In the tort action, if the court rules that U.S. law applies, what is the source
of that law?
13. In the same tort action, if the court rules that Mexican law applies, what is
the source of that law?
14. In the defamation action, if the court applies Mexican law, does that law
roughly parallel that in the U.S.? Even though Mexican law is applied, will the U.S.
court allow the U.S. defendant the free speech protections of the U.S. Constitution?
Is truth a defense to defamation in Mexico?
B. In the Commercialand Tort Actions in Mexico?
1. Would you recommend to GROWFAST that it ignore the suits, leaving the
defense and liability to GROWMEX, knowing that GROWMEX has few assets and
believing GROWFAST would not be responsible for a judgment against
GROWMEX?
2. Should you know anything about the federal and state court structure of
Mexico? What Mexican courts might have jurisdiction? Does it matter?
3. What law would a Mexican court apply?
4. Does Mexican commercial and tort law roughly parallel that in the U.S.?
5. Does Mexican defamation law roughly parallel that in the U.S.? Are
Mexican constitutional free speech protections applicable? Is truth a defense to
defamation?
6. Does the fact that there were "workers" involved affect the tort litigation?
7. Would Mexico grant punitive damages?
8. How would a Mexican court determine moral damages? Are they available
in both the commercial and tort cases?
9. Is a class action allowed in Mexico?
C. In the Tort Action in Paris?
1. Would you recommend to GROWFAST and GROWMEX that it ignore the
suit, after all the basis of jurisdiction seems extraordinary?
2. Would the French court grant a request to move the case to Mexico or the
United States on grounds similar to forum non conveniens?
3. What law would the French court apply-Mexican, U.S. or French?
4. Assuming the French court applied Mexican or U.S. law, how would it prove
such law?
5. Were the French court to apply U.S. Law, would it award punitive damages?
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D. If the English and Japanesecompanies that were the sources of some of the
chemicals were added asparties to the tort action in the United States:
1. What would be the principal issues in bringing them into the litigation in the
United States?
2. If the English company were to be brought into the U.S. litigation as a party
sharing liability with GROWFAST, and one of the plaintiffs was an English citizen
(another tourist in Mexico), how would you react to the English defendant company
going into a UK court in London with a request that the court enjoin the English
plaintiff in the U.S. from pursuing the litigation in the U.S. court?
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Assume judgments have been rendered against GROWFAST in the United
States, and against GROWFAST and GROWMEX in France and Mexico. The
judgments in the U.S. included the Japanese and U.K. suppliers of ingredients of the
SollateTM . We know that GROWFAST has assets in various parts of the U.S., in
Mexico, and in Germany. Consider some of the following:
A. Commercialand Tort Judgments in the U.S. againstGROWFAST.
1. Enforcement in the U.S.
2. Enforcement in other nations where GROWFAST has assets.
B. Commercialand Tort Judgments in Mexico againstGROWFAST and
GROWMEX.
1. Enforcement in the U.S.
2. Enforcement elsewhere.
C. Tort Judgment in FranceagainstGROWFAST and GROWMEX.
1. Enforcement in the U.S.
2. Enforcement in Germany.
3. Enforcement in Mexico.
D. Tort Judgment in the U.S. against the JapaneseCompany.
1. Enforcement in the U.S.
2. Enforcement in Japan.
E. Tort Judgment in the U.S. against the English Company.
1. Enforcement in the U.S.
2. Enforcement in the UK in view of the issuance by an English court of an
injunction ordering the English plaintiff not to proceed with the action in the U.S.,
followed by a U.S. rejection of the injunction.
3. Enforcement in Germany.

